


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SECRET

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CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Burma: Ne Win may be considering bringing civilians into his military regime. (Page 2)



25X6

Peru: The cabinet's position is becoming untenable. (Page 4)

Poland: Writer's protest (Page 5)

Tunisia: Boycott of Arab League (Page 5)

Lesotho: Deportation orders (Page 6)

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

SECRET

SECRET

South Vietnam: Military action was generally light on 29-30 September, with the only significant ground fighting centered in Quang Nam Province.

Allied reinforcements have been sent to help clear the area seized by the Communists on 28 September near the Thuong Duc Special Forces camp, but enemy forces, possibly organic to the North Vietnamese 31st Regiment, are fighting to hold their positions. The camp itself was under mortar attack throughout the 29th, although all action had ceased by nightfall.

Communist forces elsewhere seem to be avoiding heavy contact and are emphasizing economy-of-force tactics, most notably interdiction of lines of communication and mortar and rocket attacks. Actions included destruction of a bridge west of Hoi An in Quang Nam Province, eight mortar attacks scattered throughout III Corps, and a recoilless rifle attack against Binh Thuy airfield in the delta. [REDACTED]

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Burma: General Ne Win may be considering opening up his military regime to wider civilian participation.

In two major but somewhat cloudy policy speeches last week, Ne Win called for "national unity," laid heavy stress on the transitional nature of his military dictatorship, and seemed to indicate that the process of moving toward more "normal" rule was about to begin. Ne Win virtually invited civilian politicians long out of power to join him in the effort.

This is the first time in Ne Win's six years' rule that he has even implicitly offered the prospect of broadening his regime. His apparent willingness to contemplate civilian participation may reflect the cumulative effect of a generally unsuccessful stewardship, under which the Burmese economy has suffered a disastrous decline.

The vagueness of Ne Win's speeches, however, leaves his options open, and much will depend on negotiations with those civilians who might be willing to participate in his regime. He is reported to have been dickering with former prime minister U Nu and others. If they set too high a price for their cooperation, Ne Win may well revert to his habitual reliance on the small coterie of military advisers who are largely responsible for Burma's economic malaise.

[REDACTED]

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Peru: The deteriorating political situation is making the cabinet's position untenable and has brought fresh rumors of military plotting.

On 27 September, a spokesman for the principal opposition party called on the Herccelles cabinet to resign. He said that it had committed errors, and warned that "those who want to destroy democracy" were exploiting opposition to the cabinet to instigate a coup. The prime minister has since agreed that the cabinet should resign and give President Belaunde a free hand in naming a new one, [REDACTED]

25X1

The opposition's attack on the cabinet also prompted rumors of an imminent military coup, but the military evidently is not at present preparing to move against the government. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the armed forces will not attempt a coup soon unless there are large-scale, uncontrolled public disorders or the President tries to change the leadership of the armed forces.

The major issue of the moment is the government's agreement with the US-owned International Petroleum Company. A split in the governing Popular Action Party has aggravated the problem. The government is now preparing to renegotiate parts of the agreement in order to help ease the situation. [REDACTED]

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Poland: The regime evidently has not yet decided how to react to the moving letter of solidarity sent by prominent writer Jerzy Andrzejewski to Czechoslovak intellectuals. The Polish press so far has limited itself to an attack on the Yugoslav party daily Borba for having published the letter, which expressed shame at Poland's participation in the intervention. In view of the likely impact of the message on Polish intellectuals and students, the regime may decide to give it only minimum publicity. There are unconfirmed reports, however, that other Polish intellectual dissidents may soon publicize similar sentiments. [REDACTED]

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* * * *

Tunisia: The announcement that Tunisia will henceforth "boycott" all Arab League activities formalizes its walkout from the league's council meeting on 2 September. It also paves the way for another break in relations with Egypt over the issue of Nasir's dominance of the league, while reiterating Bourguiba's support of the Palestinian terrorists. By boycotting and not withdrawing, Tunisia reserves its right to participate in the future. Because the Tunisians believe that the "moderate" Arab states are somewhat sympathetic toward their position, they do not expect the boycott to affect significantly their relations with these Arab states. [REDACTED]

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Lesotho: Prime Minister Jonathan issued follow-up instructions on 28 September to refugees in his country which softened the "deportation orders" handed to all political refugees in August. The refugees, most of whom are from South Africa, are still expected to arrange for leaving Lesotho soon, but the new guidelines also clearly indicated that individual refugees may request permission to stay. The rationale for expelling refugees is obscure, but it probably stems from Jonathan's concern over the anti-government activity of some refugees, as well as from pressure by the South African Government.

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